How to Drive Value in Your Healthcare Information Technology Company Sale

One of the most demanding aspects of selling a Healthcare Software Company  is coming up with a business valuation. Sometimes the valuations provided by the marketplace defy the valuation judgment that commonly dictates a selling price for a bricks and mortar company, for example. This article covers how an investment banker can correctly position your Healthcare Information Technology Company  to the right buyer in order to accomplish a attractive transaction price

One of the most demanding factors of selling Healthcare Software Company  is coming up with a business valuation. Sometimes the valuations provided by the market (translation - a concluded transaction) defy all logic. In other business segments there are some pretty helpful rules of thumb for valuation metrics. In one line of business it may be 1 X Revenue, in another it could be 5 X EBITDA or cash flow.

Since it is essential to our business to aid our Healthcare Information Technology Company  clients raise their business selling value, I have given this considerable thought. Why are some of these Healthcare Software Company  valuations so elevated?

It is because of the profitability leverage a Healthcare Software Company  can generate. A clear-cut case in point is what is Microsoft's incremental expense to supply the next copy of Office Professional? It is most likely $1.20 for three CD's and 80 cents for packaging. Let's say the license cost is $400. The gross margin is north of 99%. That does not materialize in manufacturing or services or retail or most other industries.

One drawback in selling a small Healthcare Information Technology Company  is that they do not have any of the brand recognition, distribution, or standards leverage that the big companies own. So, on their own, they cannot produce this profitability leverage. The buying company, however, does not aim to compensate the small seller for the post acquisition results that are directly attributable to the buyer's market presence. This is what we refer to as the valuation gap.

What we attempt to do is to help the buyer rationalize paying a much higher price than a pre-acquisition financial valuation of the target company. In other words, we want to get strategic value for our seller. Below are the factors that we use in positioning our Healthcare Information Technology Company  for maximum selling price:

Cost for the buyer to develop the product internally - Many years ago, Barry Boehm, in his book, Software Engineering Economics, developed a constructive cost model for projecting the programming costs for writing computer code. He called it the COCOMO model. It was quite comprehensive and complex, but I have boiled it down and simplified it for our purposes. We have the advantage of estimating the "projects" retrospectively because we already know the number of lines of code comprising our client's products. This information is designed to help us understand what it might cost the buyer to build it internally so that he starts his own build versus buy analysis.

Most acquirers could write the code themselves, but we put forward they analyze the cost of their time to market delay. Believe me, with first mover advantage from a competitor or, worse, customer defections, there is a very real cost of not getting your product today. We were able to convince one buyer that they would be able to defend our seller's entire purchase price predicated on the amount of client defections their acquisition would avert.

Another arrow in our valuation driving quiver for our sellers is we restate historical financials using the pricing premium of the brand name acquirer. We had one client that was a small IT company that had developed a superior piece of software that compared favorably with a sizable, publicly traded company's solution. Our product had the same functionality, ease of use, and open systems platform, but there was one very significant difference. The buyer's perception of risk was far greater with the little IT company that could be "out of business tomorrow."

We were literally able to increase twofold the financial performance of our client on paper and put forward a compelling line of reasoning to the big company buyer that those results would be immediately obtainable to him post acquisition. It certainly was not GAP Accounting, but it was helpful as a tool to direct transaction value.

Financials are of great consequence so we have to acknowledge this aspect of buyer valuation as well. We generally like to build in a baseline value (before we start adding the strategic value factors) of 2 X contractually recurring revenue during the current year. So, for example, if the company has monthly maintenance contracts of $100,000 times 12 months = $1.2 million X 2 = $2.4 million as a baseline company value component. Again, this financial analysis is to establish a baseline, before we pile on the strategic value components.

We try to assign values for miscellaneous assets that the seller is providing to the buyer. Don't overlook the strategic value of Blue Chip accounts. Those accounts become a platform for the buyer's complete product suite being offered post acquisition into an "installed account." It is a lot easier to market add-on applications and products into an loyal account than it is to close that new account. These strategic accounts can possess huge importance to a purchaser.

Lastly, we use a customer acquisition cost model to propel value in the eyes of a prospective buyer. Let's say that your sales professional at 100% of Quota earns total salary and commissions of $125,000 and sells 5 net new accounts. That would mean that your base customer acquisition cost per account was $25,000. Add a 20% company overhead for the 85 accounts, for example, and the company value, using this calculation would be $2,550,000.

After reading this you may be saying to yourself, come on, this is a little far-fetched. These factors do have real value, but that value is open to a varied interpretation by the marketplace. We are trying to assign metrics to a very subjective set of components. The buyers are intelligent, and practiced in the Merger and Acquisition process and quite frankly, they try to repel these inventive approaches to driving up their economic outlay. The greatest leverage point we have is that those buyers recognize that we are presenting the same analysis to their competitors and they don't know which component or components of value that we have presented will resonate with their competition. In the final analysis, we are just trying to provide the buyers some reasonable explanation for their board of directors to justify paying far more than a financial multiple for our client's business.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Healthcare Software Company - Market Timing is Critical

When a large software company makes an acquisition in a particular niche, several other comparable acquisitions soon follow. This post discusses this market dynamic and the importance for owners of similar software companies to reevaluate their exit plans.

Our firm was engaged as a merger and acquisition advisor in 2007 to sell a Content / Document Management Software Firm. We put together a database of likely buyers in that software category and began our contact process. Fast Forward to early 2010. We have been engaged by a second Content / Document Management Firm to sell their software company. From our earlier engagement, we dusted off our database of mid-market software companies in that space and began making our phone calls.

A very interesting thing happened. 40% of these middle market software companies had been acquired by one of the large software companies. We would call one document management software company expecting the receptionist to answer by the company name in our database. Instead, we got, "Thank you for calling OpenText." Next call, instead of the expected company name, we got an EMC Company. Another call and this time, "thank you for calling Oracle." Two calls later, we reach an IBM Company.

Wow. Between mid 2007 and early 2010, there was a buying spree by the enterprise software vendors shoring up their product offering to become a much more comprehensive offering, now called ECM or enterprise content management. It was almost like a heavyweight fight - IBM punches, EMC counters, and Oracle lands a blow while OpenText dodges a punch.

For the midsized software companies in this space, these were exciting times. This rapid consolidation and active buying caused the transaction values to increase rapidly. Once the enterprise companies have added what they needed, however, the buying stops, the market returns to normal and sellers no longer command a premium price.

Now the bad news. If you were a mid-sized competitor of the acquired companies, you are now competing with very large, powerful competitors. They will dwarf your company in terms of sales force size, marketing resources, brand awareness and pricing power. Their product now becomes the safe choice in a head-to -head competition with yours.

To now compete effectively will require even more skill. Your firm can continue to provide outstanding service and responsiveness. You can provide the small company customer attention that many customers require. You can be nimble and innovate with new products and features as another way to successfully compete.

You often hear the stock market pundits say, “the trend is your friend" or "don't fight the trend." There is a certain wisdom to this sentiment. If you are in a software category that suddenly has become the target for the big software vendors, you may do best to exit according to the market conditions rather than your original retirement schedule.

Actually, the buying company will most likely want you to stay on board for a period of time to transfer customer relationships and intellectual property. So you can take your chips off the table today at an opportune time for rich valuation multiples and then retire a few years later.

If you are younger, you can secure your family's financial future, work for the new company for a few years, gain valuable experience and then exit. Now you are ready to launch your next great idea. This time it will be far easier. You will have a large base of resources and influential contacts. Also the venture capital guys might even give you money under reasonable terms. Home Run, touch em all!

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Elements of a Successful Sell-Side Engagement

Our Latest Presentation -  Welcome to our brief presentation on the MidMarket Capital Selling Process – Elements of a Successful Sell-Side Engagement. We believe there are several desired results from a successful process including completing the sale in the shortest amount of time, minimizing the demands on the company executive team, maximizing the price and terms for the owners, and finding the right buyers that will serve both current employees and acquired customers while preserving the legacy of quality the owners have built.

http://www.slideshare.net/davekauppi/selling-your-business-the-successful-sell-side-engagement-process

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Healthcare Company – Finding the Right Buyers

We are in the middle of a merger and acquisition engagement representing a Healthcare Consulting Company. We had contacted several industry players and had gotten some good initial interest. Several buyers dropped out because their entire management team was comprised of family members. We asked our client to take their company off the market and to bring in at least one non family executive that had the authority and the ability to run the company. They successfully implemented this change and asked us to take them back out to market.

Because their business is counter cyclical and actually grew during the economic downturn they posted some pretty impressive growth and profit numbers. It was difficult to determine how much of the improvement was due to the addition of the new senior manager.

As we re-launched our marketing efforts, we identified several interested buyers. One buyer was particularly interested and after signing the confidentiality agreement and reviewing the memorandum, contacted us almost daily with additional detailed information requests. Before long he started to grill us about selling price expectations. As we usually do, we deflected his requests and asked him to put together his letter of intent based on the value of the business to his company.

He started giving us a lecture about valuing services companies whose assets (meaning people) walked out the door every evening. He pointed out that their revenues were based on new sales each year and not “contractually recurring revenue”. We had our client put together for us a chart that showed the “historically recurring revenue” generated from their top 20 clients over the past five years. This was our way to demonstrate some consistency and predictability of revenues.

As we conversed further, my radar started buzzing loudly. This guy was getting ready to provide a low ball offer and was trying to sell me on all the reasons why I should go back to our client and pitch his offer. I politely listened to his well practiced approach for a little while longer. Then he came up with the statement that I just could not let go. He said that last year’s revenues were an unusual upward spike and “I am just going to use 2008’s revenues as my basis for my offer. Well, I just could not let that one go. I asked him how he would have made an offer if last year was unusually bad, but the prior five years were strong. He would not respond, but of course, the answer was that he would have made his offer based on the new trend.

There are thousands of business buyers out there that are just like this guy. There is a famous residential real estate investor that has written a book and gives classes to help individuals become real estate moguls. I could sum up his book and his class in one sentence. Find 100 people with their homes for sale. Approach them aggressively and make a low ball offer and one of them will take it.

When I reviewed where our buyer had originated, I traced it back to a posting we had made on our business broker’s association Web Site. As I think about it, these Business-for-Sale Web Sites actually give these buyers a powerful tool to actively and aggressively contact their 100 potential sellers. As I thought about this, sure enough, I have seen this behavior repeated multiple times and the source was always a Business-for-Sale Web Site.

So we are always preaching to our prospective clients to get multiple buyers involved in the process. If they post their business on one of the Business-for-Sale Web Sites, they may get multiple buyers interested, but they are those buyers that are contacting 100 sellers very efficiently through the power of the Internet in order to make their low ball offers.

But I digress. Let’s get back to our client. The good news is that we had 6 other industry buyers that we had contacted and they were looking for acquisitions that were based on acquiring new customers or adding another product offering, or leveraging their sales force or install base. In other words, their buyer motivation was not to buy a company with a low-ball offer.

The only way we can encourage buyers to make fair offers is to conduct an outbound marketing campaign to industry buyers that have strategic reasons for making acquisitions. If we can get several involved, then the buyer that comes in and says that he is going to base his offer on 2008 performance, is easily eliminated from consideration. If a business seller is only going to attract these inbound, bargain seeker buyers from Web Sites, he/she will only be getting low ball offers and wasting a lot of time.


Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Business - The M&A Process

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An Alternative to Venture Capital for the Healthcare Entrepreneur

If you are an entrepreneur with a small healthcare company looking to take it to the next level, this article should be of particular interest to you. Your natural inclination may be to seek venture capital or private equity to fund your growth. This article discusses a different strategy that provides smart money for the entrepreneur, a growth engine, and a way to participate in upside growth.



If you are an entrepreneur with a small healthcare company looking to take it to the next level, this article should be of particular interest to you. Your natural inclination may be to seek venture capital or private equity to fund your growth. According to Jim Casparie, founder and CEO of the Venture Alliance, the odds of getting Venture funding remain below 3%. Given those odds, the six to nine month process, the heavy, often punishing valuations, the expense of the process, this might not be the best path for you to take. We have created a hybrid M&A model designed to bring the appropriate capital resources to you entrepreneurs. It allows the entrepreneur to bring in smart money and to maintain control. We have taken the experiences of several healthcare entrepreneurs and combined that with our traditional investment banker Merger and Acquisition approach and crafted a model that both large industry players and the high tech business owners are embracing.



Our experiences in the healthcare space led us to the conclusion that new product introductions were most efficiently and cost effectively the purview of the smaller, nimble, low overhead companies and not the healthcare giants. Most of the recent blockbuster products have been the result of an entrepreneurial effort from an early stage company bootstrapping its growth in a very cost conscious lean environment. The big companies, with all their seeming advantages experienced a high failure rate in new product introductions and the losses resulting from this art of capturing the next hot technology were substantial. Don't get us wrong. There were hundreds of failures from the start-ups as well. However, the failure for the edgy little start-up resulted in losses in the $1 - $5 million range. The same result from an industry giant was often in the $100 million to $250 million range.



For every Google, Ebay, or Salesforce.com, there are literally hundreds of companies that either flame out or never reach a critical mass beyond a loyal early adapter market. It seems like the mentality of these smaller business owners is, using the example of the popular TV show, Deal or No Deal, to hold out for the $1 million briefcase. What about that logical contestant that objectively weighs the facts and the odds and cashes out for $280,000?



As we discussed the dynamics of this market, we were drawn to a merger and acquisition model commonly used by technology bell weather, Cisco Systems, that we felt could also be applied to a broad cross section of companies in the high tech niche. Cisco Systems is a serial acquirer of companies. They do a tremendous amount of R&D and organic product development. They recognize, however, that they cannot possibly capture all the new developments in this rapidly changing field through internal development alone.



Cisco seeks out investments in promising, small, technology companies and this approach has been a key element in their market dominance. They bring what we refer to as smart money to the high tech entrepreneur. They purchase a minority stake in the early stage company with a call option on acquiring the remainder at a later date with an agreed-upon valuation multiple. This structure is a brilliantly elegant method to dramatically enhance the risk reward profile of new product introduction. Here is why:



For the Entrepreneur: (Just substitute in your healthcare industry giant's name that is in your category for Cisco below)



1. The involvement of Cisco- resources, market presence, brand, distribution capability is a self- fulfilling prophecy to your product's success.



2. For the same level of dilution that an entrepreneur would get from a VC, angel investor or private equity group, the entrepreneur gets the performance leverage of "smart money." See #1.



3. The entrepreneur gets to grow his business with Cisco's support at a far more rapid pace than he could alone. He is more likely to establish the critical mass needed for market leadership within his industry's brief window of opportunity.



4. He gets an exit strategy with an established valuation metric while the buyer helps him make his exit much more lucrative.



5. As an old Wharton professor used to ask, "What would you rather have, all of a grape or part of a watermelon?" That sums it up pretty well. The involvement of Cisco gives the product a much better probability of growing significantly. The entrepreneur will own a meaningful portion of a far bigger asset.



For the Large Company Investor:

1. Create access to a large funnel of developing technology and products.



2. Creates a very nimble, market sensitive, product development or R&D arm.



3. Minor resource allocation to the autonomous operator during his "skunk works" market proving development stage.



4. Diversify their product development portfolio- because this approach provides for a relatively small investment in a greater number of opportunities fueled by the entrepreneurial spirit, they greatly improve the probability of creating a winner.



5. By investing early and getting an equity position in a small company and favorable valuation metrics on the call option, they pay a fraction of the market price to what they would have to pay if they acquired the company once the product had proven successful.



Let's use two hypothetical companies to demonstrate this model, Big Green Technologies, and Mobile CRM Systems. Big Green Technologies utilized this model successfully with their investment in Mobile CRM Systems. Big Green Technologies acquired a 25% equity stake in Mobile CRM Systems in 1999 for $4 million. While allowing this entrepreneurial firm to operate autonomously, they backed them with leverage and a modest level of capital resources. Sales exploded and Big Green Technologies exercised their call option on the remaining 75% equity in Mobile CRM Systems in 2004 for $224 million. Sales for Mobile CRM Systems were projected to hit $420 million in 2005.



Given today's valuation metrics for a company with Mobile CRM Systems' growth rate and profitability, their market cap is about $1.26 Billion, or 3 times trailing 12 months revenue. Big Green Technologies invested $5 million initially, gave them access to their leverage, and exercised their call option for $224 million. Their effective acquisition price totaling $229 million represents an 82% discount to Mobile CRM Systems' 2005 market cap.



Big Green Technologies is reaping additional benefits. This acquisition was the catalyst for several additional investments in the mobile computing and content end of the tech industry. These acquisitions have transformed Big Green Technologies from a low growth legacy provider into a Wall Street standout with a growing stable of high margin, high growth brands.



Big Green Technologies' profits have tripled in four years and the stock price has doubled since 2000, far outpacing the tech industry average. This success has triggered the aggressive introduction of new products and new markets. Not bad for a $5 million bet on a new product in 1999. Wait, let's not forget about our entrepreneur. His total proceeds of $229 million are a fantastic 5-year result for a little company with 1999 sales of under $20 million.



MidMarket Capital has borrowed this model combining the Cisco hybrid acquisition experience with our investment banking experience to offer this unique Investment Banking service. MMCA can either represent the small entrepreneurial firm looking for the "smart money" investment with the appropriate growth partner or the large industry player looking to enhance their new product strategy with this creative approach. This model has successfully served the technology industry through periods of outstanding growth and market value creation. Many of the same dynamics are present today in the high tech industry and these same transaction structures can be similarly employed to create value.



Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Healthcare Company- Beware of the Tire Kicker

If you are approached by an unsolicited offer to buy your healthcare company, you might think this a good thing. If not handled properly, it could be a real drain on your company's performance.



We are often contacted by a healthcare company owner after he has been approached by a buyer. He wants information from us on the merger and acquisition process, which we are happy to provide. He wants to wait, however, to engage our firm to sell his company "until this situation with the buyer plays itself out."This is the start of the death spiral. I don't want to sound overly dramatic, but this rarely has a happy ending. These supposed buyers will drain your time, resources, focus on running your business and, your company's performance. They want to buy your business as the only bidder and get a big discount. They will kick your tires, kick your tires, and kick your tires some more.



If they finally get to an offer after months of this resource drain, it, to the surprise or chagrin of the owner, is woefully short of expectations. A second potential outcome is that when the offer does come, the owner doesn't know if it is a good or bad offer. Finally, once the buyer has tied up the owner with the LOI, he then proceeds to attack transaction value through every step of due diligence. He is the only suitor so there is nothing to stop bad behavior.



This is so costly to the business owner. Many owners repeat this process several times before they acknowledge the damage being done to their software company. When they do eventually hire a merger and acquisition firm or a business broker, the company value has eroded substantially.Even though we have watched this situation unfold from a distance many times, we have been frustrated by our lack of success in changing the owner's incurable optimism about this buyer. Being the deal guys that we are, we needed to come up with a creative solution and a deal structure to move the healthcare business owner toward a better outcome. If we feel so strongly that this buyer will not be the actual buyer in the end, we should be willing to "carve out" that buyer in the form of a discounted success fee.



By George, that's it! If an owner has an identified buyer, we can incorporate a sliding scale discount on the success fee over time if this identified buyer becomes the actual buyer. If he becomes the actual buyer very quickly the discount is big. If the deal closes after five months of our M&A work, the discount has slid to zero because we have thrown him into the mix with several other qualified buyers and his offer will have been leveraged higher by 25% or more.



The benefits to the healthcare business owner with this approach are meaningful. First, if this is that rare occurrence of a legitimate buyer with a legitimate offer, the owner will not pay a big success fee for a small amount of work. Secondly, the owner can turn the burden of the process over to the M&A firm, freeing him up to successfully run his business during the process. Next, we end the endless, resource draining, tire kicking that erodes business value. Finally, by changing this from an auction of one to a truly competitive bidding situation involving the universe of qualified buyers, the owner will have no doubt that he got the best the market had to offer for his business.





Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital