Saturday, July 5, 2014

Do Your Healthcare Software Sales Match the Excellence of Your Product

Smaller healthcare software companies often face a very difficult time penetrating the larger customers and achieving a critical mass in sales. The industry is quite conservative and has a bias toward doing business with the old reliable legacy providers. This post discusses this dynamic and approaches to minimizing the impact on growing sales.

When asked if their company sales matched the excellence of their products,  many entrepreneurs, technology based companies or healthcare companies, the answer to that question is a resounding, NO! There is an exception to this with the rapid rise of the new economy, new media, highly scalable companies like Open Table, Uber, Airbnb, YouTube, and others.

In their case, their prospective customers highly value their newness, their breaking the mold, their non-establishment approach. They are viewed as doing what they do far better than the technology establishment stalwarts. The notable exception to this is Apple who has been able to transcend old establishment and be accepted as both old and new economy.

But I digress. Back to topic. Most companies that sell to other companies, or B2B companies are evaluated by their potential customers in a traditional risk reward analysis. Or using computer terminology, their buying decisions are made using a legacy system. It was once said that no one ever got fired for making an IBM decision.
Let's look at this legacy buying model and see exactly why your company's sales do not match the elegance of your solution.

One of our healthcare clients insisted that we read CROSSING THE CHASM by Geoffrey Moore to give us greater perspective on his company's situation. By the way, if you are a smaller technology based or healthcare company selling in the B2B space, this should be required reading.

Our client was a two year old company selling a cutting edge, on-line nurse shift bidding and self scheduling system to hospitals. This is a great product. The ROI's were easily quantifiable. The handful of installed accounts loved it. Most importantly, it had a positive effect on the nursing staff's morale. This alone could justify the cost of the system.
Our client had some very encouraging early success selling his solution to some of the more progressive hospitals. They received some outstanding early PR. After that initial success, however, our little edgy technology based company hit the wall.

The sales cycle went from six months to beyond twelve months. Cash flow became an issue and, to top it off, a generously funded venture backed competitor with well known industry executives was aggressively developing this new market.

What was happening? Our clients were very smart people and figured out what was happening. They knew that they would have to make some difficult and dramatic decisions in short order. Turns out the majority of hospitals are legacy buyers and make buying decisions based on a risk avoidance paradigm.
Our client's early success was realized as a result of selling to the small minority of early adapters in their industry. These are the pioneers that don't mind the arrows in their backs from heading out West with new products or new vendors.

Legacy buyers, however, do not value references that are early adapters. They are known to have a much higher risk tolerance than the traditional majority. Below are some buying criteria from these legacy buyers:

1. Big is good. Bigger is better. Buying inferior technology solutions from a blue chip publicly traded company wins most of the time.

2. Old is good. There is no replacement for experience and the grey haired company beats the gelled hair Tech Wizard company more often than not.

3. Industry Cred means everything. If you are a company that adapted your product from success in another vertical market and you are entering our space, the old familiar face carries the most weight.

4. Will the little guy be in business next year? The failure rate for the sub $ million company is a thousand times greater than for the $ billion company. This change in technology is painful enough. Do I want to risk having to do it over again in a year?

5. If I have problems, the big guy can fill the skies with blue suits until my problem is solved. The little guys cannot appropriately respond to my problem.

This is a punishing gauntlet for the small companies and it is amazing that any new companies survive in this environment. Let's look at a few of the "crossing the chasm" strategies that have been effective in swaying legacy buyers decision making in favor of the smaller provider with superior technology.

A. A well-known executive from an established healthcare company is put at the helm of the new company. The thinking from the buyer is that if he did it once, he can do it again.

B. Get an industry-recognized authority to endorse your solution or, better yet, have them join your board or advisory council.

C. Close a deal with a conservative, well respected customer and make them your marquee account with all the trimmings - i.e. a contract with a favored nations clause, the technology or computer code held in escrow with specific instructions if you go out of business, case studies and Public Relations glorifying the progressive decision maker, and providing an equity stake in your company are some examples.

D. Forging a strategic alliance, joint marketing agreement or resellers agreement with an industry giant. All of a sudden your small company risk factors have been eliminated and it has only cost you 30%-50% of revenue on each sale they make.

E. Sell your company to the best strategic buyer. Sometimes the best solution is to sell your company to the best strategic buyer for your greatest economic value. This is the most difficult decision for an entrepreneur to make. Below are some of the market dynamics that would point to that decision. Note: several of these factors influenced our entrepreneurial clients to ultimately sell their business to an industry giant.

You see your window of opportunity closing rapidly. You may have great technology and the market is starting to recognize the value of the solution. However, you have a small competitor that was just acquired by a big industry player. The bad news is you probably have to sell to remain competitive. The good news is that the market will likely bid up the value of your company to offset the competitive move of the big buyer.

The strategic alliance is with the right company, but the sales force has no sense of urgency or no focus on selling your product. The large company lacks the commitment to drive your sales. An amazing thing happens with an acquisition. The CEO is out to prove that his decision was the right one. He will make his decision right. All of a sudden there is laser focus on integrating this new product and driving sales.

You have created a strategic alliance and poured your company's resources into educating, supporting, and evangelizing your product. Whoops, you have counted on this golden goose and it has not met your expectations. Also you have neglected your other business development and sales efforts while focusing on this partner.

Many large healthcare companies now employ a try it before you buy it approach to M&A. They find a good technology, formalize a strategic alliance, dangle the carrot of massive distribution and expect the small company to educate and integrate with his sales force. Often this relationship drains the financial performance of the smaller company. If you decide to sell at this point your value to another potential buyer has been diminished.

Do not despair. If you have demonstrated a cultural fit and have helped your products work in conjunction with the big company's product suite, you have largely eliminated post acquisition integration risk. This can often more than offset any short-term profit erosion you may have suffered.

It is not easy for the smaller healthcare company to reach critical mass in this very competitive and conservative environment. Working harder will not necessarily get you where you need to be. Step back and look at your environment through the eyes of your buyers. Implement some of these strategies to remove the risk barriers to doing business with your company. Now you have created an opportunity for your sales to match the elegance of your technology solution.


Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Healthcare Information Technology - Business Valuation



Business valuations for healthcare information technology companies is more of an art than a science. Ultimately a competitive market bid situation is the only true method. I attempt to quantify the important valuation elements in this article.

One of the most challenging aspects of selling a healthcare information technology company is coming up with a business valuation. Sometimes the valuations provided by the market (translation - a completed transaction) defy all logic. In other industry segments there are some pretty handy rules of thumb for valuation metrics. In one industry it may be 1 X Revenue, in another it could be 7.5 X EBITDA.

Since it is critical to our business to help our healthcare information technology clients maximize their business selling price, I have given this considerable thought. Why are some of these software company valuations so high? It is because of the profitability leverage of technology. A simple example is what is Microsoft's incremental cost to produce the next copy of Office Professional? It is probably $1.20 for three CD's and 80 cents for packaging. Let's say the license cost is $400. The gross margin is north of 99%. That does not happen in manufacturing or services or retail or most other industries.

One problem in selling a small healthcare technology company is that they do not have any of the brand name, distribution, or standards leverage that the big companies possess. So, on their own, they cannot create this profitability leverage. The acquiring company, however, does not want to compensate the small seller for the post acquisition results that are directly attributable to the buyer's market presence. This is what we refer to as the valuation gap.
What we attempt to do is to help the buyer justify paying a much higher price than a pre-acquisition financial valuation of the target company. In other words, we want to get strategic value for our seller. Below are the factors that we use in our analysis:

1. Cost for the buyer to write the code internally - Many years ago, Barry Boehm, in his book, Software Engineering Economics, developed a constructive cost model for projecting the programming costs for writing computer code. He called it the COCOMO model. It was quite detailed and complex, but I have boiled it down and simplified it for our purposes. We have the advantage of estimating the "projects" retrospectively because we already know the number of lines of code comprising our client's products. In general terms he projected that it takes 3.6 person months to write one thousand SLOC (source lines of code). So if you looked at a senior software engineer at a $70,000 fully loaded compensation package writing a program with 15,000 SLOC, your calculation is as follows - 15 X 3.6 = 54 person months X $5,800 per month = $313,200 divided by 15,000 = $20.88/SLOC
.
Before you guys with 1,000,000 million lines of code get too excited about your $20.88 million business value, there are several caveats. Unfortunately the market does not care and will not pay for what it cost you to develop your product. Secondly, this information is designed to help us understand what it might cost the buyer to develop it internally so that he starts his own build versus buy analysis. Thirdly, we have to apply discounts to this analysis if the software is three generations old legacy code, for example. In that case, it is discounted by 90%. You are no longer a technology sale with high profitability leverage. They are essentially acquiring your customer base and the valuation will not be that exciting.
If, however, your application is a brand new application that has legs, start sizing your yacht. Examples of this might be a click fraud application, Pay Pal, or Internet Telephony. The second high value platform would be where your software technology "leap frogs" a popular legacy application. An example of this is when we sold a company that had completely rewritten their legacy management platform in Microsoft.Net. They leap frogged the dominant player in that space that was supporting multiple second generation solutions. Our client became a compelling strategic acquisition. Fast forward one year and I hear the acquirer is selling one of these $100,000 systems per week. Now that's leverage!

2. Most acquirers could write the code themselves, but we suggest they analyze the cost of their time to market delay. Believe me, with first mover advantage from a competitor or, worse, customer defections, there is a very real cost of not having your product today. We were able to convince one buyer that they would be able to justify our seller's entire purchase price based on the number of client defections their acquisition would prevent. As it turned out, the buyer had a huge install base and through multiple prior acquisitions was maintaining six disparate software platforms to deliver essentially the same functionality.

This was very expensive to maintain and they passed those costs on to their disgruntled install base. The buyer had been promising upgrades for a few years, but nothing was delivered. Customers were beginning to sign on with their major competitor. Our pitch to the buyer was to make this acquisition, demonstrate to your client base that you are really providing an upgrade path and give notice of support withdrawal for 4 or 5 of the other platforms. The acquisition was completed and, even though their customers that were contemplating leaving did not immediately upgrade, they did not defect either. Apparently the devil that you know is better than the devil you don't in the world of healthcare information technology.

3. Another arrow in our valuation driving quiver for our sellers is we restate historical financials using the pricing power of the brand name acquirer. We had one client that was a small healthcare IT company that had developed a fine piece of software that compared favorably with a large, publicly traded company's solution. Our product had the same functionality, ease of use, and open systems platform, but there was one very important difference. The end-user customer's perception of risk was far greater with the little IT company that could be "out of business tomorrow." We were literally able to double the financial performance of our client on paper and present a compelling argument to the big company buyer that those economics would be immediately available to him post acquisition. It certainly was not GAP Accounting, but it was effective as a tool to drive transaction value.

4. Financials are important so we have to acknowledge this aspect of buyer valuation as well. We generally like to build in a baseline value (before we start adding the strategic value components) of 2 X contractually recurring revenue during the current year. So, for example, if the company has monthly maintenance contracts of $100,000 times 12 months = $1.2 million X 2 = $2.4 million as a baseline company value component. Another component we add is for any contracts that extend beyond one year. We take an estimate of the gross margin produced in the firm contract years beyond year one and assign a 5 X multiple to that and discount it to present value.

Let's use an example where they had 4 years remaining on a services contract and the last 3 years were $200,000 per year in revenue with approximately 50% gross margin. We would take the final tree years of $100,000 annual gross margin and present value it at a 5% discount rate resulting in $265,616. This would be added to the earlier 2 X recurring year 1 revenue from above. Again, this financial analysis is to establish a baseline, before we pile on the strategic value components.

5. We try to assign values for miscellaneous assets that the seller is providing to the buyer. Don't overlook the strategic value of Blue Chip Accounts. Those accounts become a platform for the buyer's entire product suite being sold post acquisition into an "installed account." It is far easier to sell add-on applications and products into an existing account than it is to open up that new account. These strategic accounts can have huge value to a buyer.
6. Finally, we use a customer acquisition cost model to drive value in the eyes of a potential buyer. Let's say that your sales person at 100% of Quota earns total salary and commissions of $125,000 and sells 5 net new accounts. That would mean that your base customer acquisition cost per account was $25,000. Add a 20% company overhead for the 85 accounts, for example, and the company value, using this methodology would be $2,550,000.

7. Our final valuation component is what we call the defensive factor. This is very real in the healthcare information technology arena. What is the value to a large firm of preventing his competitor from acquiring your technology and improving their competitive position in the marketplace. One of our clients had an outcomes database and nurse staffing software algorithm. The owner was the recognized expert in this area and had industry credibility. This was a small add on application to two large industry players' integrated hospital applications suite. This module was viewed as providing a slight features advantage to the company that could integrate it with their main systems. The selling price for one of these major software systems to a hospital chain was often more than $50 million. The value paid for our client was determined, not by the financial performance of our client, but by the competitive edge they could provide post acquisition. Our client did very well on her company sale.

After reading this you may be saying to yourself, come on, this is a little far fetched. These components do have real value, but that value is open to a broad interpretation by the marketplace. We are attempting to assign metrics to a very subjective set of components. The buyers are smart, and experienced in the M&A process and quite frankly, they try to deflect these artistic approaches to driving up their financial outlay. The best leverage point we have is that those buyers know that we are presenting the same analysis to their competitors and they don't know which component or components of value that we have presented will resonate with their competition. In the final analysis, we are just trying to provide the buyers some reasonable explanation for their board of directors to justify paying 8 X revenues for an acquisition.
 
Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Thursday, January 30, 2014

Looking to Sell a Healthcare Company - Consider an M&A Advisor


 Perhaps the most important business transaction you will ever pursue is the sale of your business. Many healthcare business owners attempt to do it themselves and when asked if they got a good deal, many respond with "I think so," or "I got my asking price," or "I really don’t know," or "It was a disaster."  Often times these very capable business people approach the sale of their business with less formality than in the sale of a home. The purpose of this article is to answer the questions – Why would I use an M&A Advisor and what am I getting for the fees I will pay?

  1. Confidentiality.  If an owner tries to sell his own business, that process alone reveals to the world that his business is for sale.  Employees, customers, suppliers, and bankers all get nervous and competitors get predatory. The M&A Advisor protects the identity of the company he represents for sale with a process designed to contact only owner approved buyers with a blind profile – a document describing the company without revealing its identity. In order for the buyer to gain access to any sensitive information he must sign a confidentiality agreement. That generally eliminates the tire kickers and deters behaviors detrimental to the seller’s business

  1. Business Continuity.  Selling a business is a full time job. The healthcare business owner is already performing multiple functions instrumental to the success of his business. By taking on the load of selling his business, many of those essential functions will get less attention, sometimes causing irreparable damage to the business. The owner must maintain focus on running his business at its full potential while it is being sold.

  1. Time to Close. Since an M&A Advisor's function is to sell the business, he has a much better chance of closing a transaction faster than the owner. The faster the sale, the lower the risk of business erosion, customer defection, employee problems and predatory competition.

  1. Large Universe of Buyers. M&A Advisors subscribe to databases of the various healthcare business categories that enable them to screen for buyers that are in a certain SIC Code and have revenues that would support the potential acquisition. In addition they maintain  custom databases of  the various healthcare categories refined even further to hone in on only the best potential buyers for your business. A good M&A Advisor also has access to private equity groups databases that outline their buying criteria.

  1. Marketing. An M&A Advisor can help present the business in its best light to maximize selling price. He understands how to recast financials to recognize the EBITDA potential post acquisition. Higher EBITDA = higher selling price. He understands the key value drivers for buyers in a particular healthcare segment and can help the owner identify changes that translate into enhanced selling price.

  1. Valuation Knowledge. The value of a healthcare business is far more difficult to ascertain than the value of a house or even the value of a "bricks and mortar" type business. Every business is unique and has hundreds of variables that effect value.  M&A Advisors have access to business transaction databases, but those should be used as guidelines or reference points. The best way for a business owner to truly feel comfortable that he got the best deal is to have several financially viable parties bidding for his business. A healthcare industry transaction database may indicate the value of your business based on certain valuation multiples, but the market provides the real answer. An industry database, for example, can not put a value to a particular buyer on a key customer relationship or a proprietary technology. Most business owners that act as their own M&A Advisor get only one buyer involved – either another business that approaches him with an unsolicited offer or a referral from his banker, accountant, or outside attorney.  Just look at the additional billion plus dollars of value created for MCI shareholders because of the competitive bidding between Verison and Quest Communications.

  1. Balance of Experience.  Most corporate buyers have acquired multiple businesses while sellers usually have only one sale. In one situation we represented a first-time seller being pursued by a buyer with 26 previous acquisitions. Buyers want the lowest price and the most favorable terms. The inexperienced seller will be negotiating in the dark. To every term and condition in the buyer’s favor the buyer will respond with, "that is standard practice" or "that is the market" or "this is how we did it in ten other deals." By engaging an M&A Advisor the seller has an advocate with a similar experience base to help preserve the seller’s transaction value and structure.

  1. Maximize the Value of Seller’s Outside Professionals. An M&A Advisor can save the seller significantly on professional hourly fees by managing several important functions leading up to contract. His compensation is usually comprised of a reasonable monthly fee plus a success fee that is a percentage of the transaction value. The M&A Advisor and seller negotiate with the buyer the business terms of the transaction (sale price, down payment, seller financing, etc.) prior to turning the purchase agreement over to outside counsel for legal review.  In the absence of the M&A Advisor, that sometimes-exhaustive negotiation process would default to the outside attorney. It is not his area of expertise and could result in significant hourly fees.

  1. Maintain Buyer – Seller Relationship. The sale of a business is an emotional process and can become contentious. The M&A Advisor acts as a buffer between the buyer and seller. This not only improves the likelihood of the transaction closing, but helps preserve a healthy buyer – seller relationship post closing. Many times the seller will become an integral part of the management team of the buyer's company after the sale. Often buyers want sellers to have a portion of their transaction value contingent on the successful performance of the company post closing.  Buyer and seller need to be on the same team after closing.

A model that is becoming quite popular in the healthcare industry is for the big players to identify good technologies in smaller companies and to forge partnerships or strategic alliances with them. The larger company will have the smaller company spend a great deal of their resources and attention in educating the bigger player on their product and market. The smaller partner will often work very hard to integrate their offering into the broad product set of the bigger partner. Finally, the smaller company will put all their eggs into this one basket of opportunity. After the larger company has effectively removed most of the integration risk on the smaller company's nickel, they then make an unsolicited offer to buy. The smaller company is often less profitable during this "try it before you buy it period."  The bigger player then predicates their offer on the latest period financials.

A good M&A Advisor can help the smaller company navigate and recover from this situation.  Our experiences with businesses that engaged our firm as a result of an unsolicited offer from a buyer have been quite instructive. The eventual selling price averaged over 20% higher than the first offer. In no case was the business sold at the initial price. To conclude, an M&A Advisor helps reduce the risk of business erosion with improved confidentiality while allowing the owner to focus on running the business. The M&A Advisor led sale helps maximize sales proceeds by involving a large universe of buyers in a competitive bidding process. Finally, the M&A Advisor can improve the likelihood that the sale closes by buffering buyer – seller negotiations and by balancing the experience scales.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

Selling a Healthcare Technology Company - Bridging the Valuation Gap between Business Seller and Business Buyer

In an earlier article we discussed a survey that we did with the Business Broker and the Merger and Acquisition profession.  68.9% of respondents felt that their top challenge was dealing with their seller client’s valuation expectations. This is the number one reason that, as one national Investment Banking firm estimates only 10% of businesses that are for sale will actually close within 3 years of going to market. That is a 90% failure rate.

As we look to improve the performance of our practice, we looked for ways to judge the valuation expectations and reasonableness of our potential client. An M&A firm that fails to complete the sale of a client, even if they charged an up-front or monthly fees, suffers a financial loss along with their client. Those fees are not enough to cover the amount of work devoted to these projects. We determined that having clients with reasonable value expectations was a key success factor. 

We explored a number of options including preparing a mock letter of intent to present to the client after analyzing his business. This mock LOI included not only transaction value, but also the amount of cash at closing, earn outs, seller notes and any other factors we felt would be components of a market buyer offer. If you can believe it, that mock LOI was generally not well received. For example, one client was a service business and had no recurring revenue contracts in place. In other words, their next year’s revenues had to be sold and delivered next year. Their assets were their people and their people walked out the door every night.

Our mock LOI included a deal structure that proposed 70% of transaction value would be based on a percentage of the next four years of revenue performance as an earn out payment. Our client was adamant that this structure would be a non-starter. Fast forward 9 months and 30 buyers that had signed Confidentiality Agreements and reviewed the Memorandum withdrew from the buying process. It was only after that level of market feedback was he willing to consider the message of the market.

We decided to eliminate this approach because the effect was to put us sideways with our client early in the M&A process. The clients viewed our attempted dose of reality as not being on their side. No one likes to hear that you have an ugly baby. We found the reaction from our clients almost that pronounced.

We tried probing into our clients’ rationale for their valuation expectations and we would hear such comments as, “This is how much we need in order to retire and maintain our lifestyle,” or, “I heard that Acme Consulting sold for 1 X revenues,” or, “We invested $3 million in developing this software, so we should get at least $4.5 million.”

My unspoken reaction to these comments is that the market doesn’t care what you need to retire. It doesn’t care how much you invested in the product. The market does care about valuation multiples, but timing, company characteristics and circumstances are all unique and different. When our client brings us an example of IBM bought XYZ Software Company for 2 X revenues so we should get 2X revenues.  It is simply not appropriate to draw a conclusion about your value when compared to an IBM acquired company.  You have revenues of $6 million and they had $300 million in revenue, were in business for 28 years, had 2,000 installed customers, were cash flowing $85 million annually and are a recognized brand name. Larger companies carry a valuation premium compared to small companies.

When I say my unspoken reaction, please refer to my success with the mock LOI discussed earlier. So now we are on to Plan C in how to deal with this valuation gap between our seller clients and the buyers that we present. Plan C turned out to be a bust also. Our clients did not respond very favorable when in response to their statement of value expectations we asked, “Are you kidding me?” or “What are you smoking?”

This issue becomes even more difficult when the business is heavily based on intellectual property such as a healthcare technology, software or information technology firm.  There is much broader interpretation by the market than for more traditional bricks and mortar firms. With the asset based businesses we can present comparables that provide us and our clients a range of possibilities. If a business is to sell outside of the usual parameters, there must be some compelling value creator like a coveted customer list, a new SaaS or Cloud Based offering, a new mobile application, proprietary intellectual property, unusual profitability, rapid growth, significant barriers to entry, or something that is not easily duplicated.

For an information technology, computer technology, or healthcare company, comparables are helpful and are appropriate for gift and estate valuations, key man insurance, and for a starting point for a company sale. However, because the market often values these kinds of companies very generously in a competitive bid process, we recommend just that when trying to determine value in a company sale.  The value is significantly impacted by the professional M&A process. In these companies where there can be broad interpretation of its value by the market it is essential to conduct the right process to unlock all of the value.

So you might be thinking, how do we handle value expectations in these technology based company situations? Now we are on to Plan D and I must admit it is a big improvement over Plan C (are you kidding)? The good news is that Plan D has the highest success rate. The bad news is that Plan D is the most difficult. We have determined that we as M&A professionals are not the right authority on our client’s value, the market is.

After years of what are some of the most emotionally charged events in a business owner’s life, we have determined that we must earn our credibility to fully gain his trust. If the client feels like his broker or investment banker is just trying to get him to accept the first deal so that the representative can earn his success fee, there will be no trust and probably no deal.

If the client sees his representatives bring multiple, qualified buyers to the table, present the opportunity intelligently and strategically, fight for value creation, and provide buyer feedback, that  process creates credibility and trust.  The client may not be totally satisfied with the value the market is communicating, but he should be totally satisfied that we have brought him the market. If we can get to that point, the likelihood of a completed transaction increases dramatically.
The client is now faced with a very difficult decision and a test of reasonableness.  Can he interpret  the market feedback, balance that against the potential disappointment  resulting from his preconceived value expectations and complete a transaction? 

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital

I Want to Sell my Healthcare Information Technology Company Once I Close That Big Sale

Often times high tech entrepreneurs recognize that it is an opportune time for them to sell their business. One of the most compelling reasons is that they have achieved a slight technological advantage over the competition with their latest version or release. They recognize that their window of opportunity, however, is limited and that they must scale in order to protect their lead. Even though the time is right, they delay the company sale in order to capture that big deal in the pipeline.

You have made the decision to sell your healthcare information technology company. Maybe it was because your prospects are selecting the inferior product but superior safety of your brand name competitor. It could be that one of the industry giants recently acquired one of your small but worthy competitors and has removed the risk component of a buyer's decision. You may think that you have a limited window of opportunity for your Cloud-Based or Mobile Enabled technology solution and you should sell it while it still enjoys a competitive advantage.

These are all good reasons to set your business sale process in motion. A critical element here is time. Good technology not achieving meaningful market penetration is vulnerable to competition. Given this scenario, the more rapidly you can get your acquisition opportunity in front of the viable buyers, the better your chance for more favorable sale terms and conditions.

All systems go, right? But wait. We have a major proposal out to that 30 hospital chain and when we get that deal our sale price will sky rocket. So we are just going to wait for that deal to close and then put our company up for sale.

Let me give you a gem here. We will call it the Moving Sales Pipeline Theorem. It states that the sales pipeline always moves to the right. This is based on over 20 years in technology sales and sales management experience and many years of selling companies with sales pipelines. The sales either take much longer than projected or do not materialize at all.

Given this, the time critical nature of your pending healthcare technology business sale, and your desire to ring the bell from your 30 hospital chain deal, what do you do?
You engage a great M&A firm that specializes in Healthcare Information Technology companies (I know of one if you are interested) to sell your business. Let them focus on selling your business and you focus on running your business and closing that big sale.

 Get several buyers interested and negotiate for your best deal. There will be a lot of give and take here. At the right moment, as a counter to one of the buyer's points, you ask for a 6-month window, post acquisition to close that deal. You then ask, for example, for an earn out incentive of 50% of the contracted first year revenues of the hospital deal as "additional transaction value" payable 30 days after the one year purchase anniversary date.

There are lots of moving parts here so let me elaborate. The first element is you do not delay your business sale process. We already established that it was time critical. Secondly, I very carefully chose the language "additional transaction value".  We want to make sure that this payment is not confused with ordinary income at double the long term capital gains tax rate. Third, you have a way better chance of closing the big hospital chain as a division of G. E. Healthcare, for example, than as XYZ Diagnostic Software, Inc. Finally, what a great way to kick off a relationship than a big collaborative sales win that makes the buyer look really smart. Your earn out check will be the most enjoyable payment they can make.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and President of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of healthcare companies. For more information about selling your healthcare company, visit our website MidMarket Capital